people vs. gaorana 289 scra 652 (Habitual)

On March 5, 1991, before 2:00 oclock in the afternoon when private complainant arrived in appellants house, she saw appellant and Rowena lying down. Rowena bade her to come in and told her to sit down. Rowena then stood up and told private complainant that she [would] urinate. Appellant approached private complainant, covered her mouth and pointed a hunting knife to her neck. He told her that he [would] kill her if she [would] tell her mother. Private complainant fought appellant but appellant pulled her inside a room. Appellant made her lie down on the floor. Appellant then took off his pants and opened private complainants duster and removed her panty. He put himself on top of private complainant and had intercourse with her. All the while, private complainants mouth was covered with a handkerchief.

The second incident of rape occurred at around 3:00 oclock in the morning of March 6, 1991. Private complainant was sleeping in the sala with her brother and sister when she was awakened by the kisses of appellant. Appellant had a knife which scared private complainant. Appellant pulled private complainant from the mat, removed his pants, opened her duster and removed her panty, and again had intercourse with her. Private complainant did not shout because she was afraid of appellant who was a prisoner and had already killed somebody. After satisfying his lust, appellant left.

HELD
The two Informations alleged that both instances of rape were attended by the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The trial court made no express ruling that appellant was a quasi-recidivist, and rightly so. During the trial, the prosecution manifested that appellant had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental in Crim. Case No. 013 on March 29, 1988 and was serving sentence for the crime of homicide.[34] However, the prosecution failed or neglected to present in evidence the record of appellants previous conviction. Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused.[35] The fact that appellant was an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had been rendered against him.[36]

people vs. almoguerra 415 scra 647

FACTS: Aggravated by treachery and Dwelling
On May 9, 1994, spouses Florentino and Lily Julaton went to the polling precinct at Barangay Pia, San Jacinto, Masbate, to cast their votes in the barangay elections.[3] Before leaving, they instructed their three (3) children, namely: Gina, 14 years old, Lyn, 8 years old and Rey, 7 years old, to watch their store and prevent strangers from entering their house.[4]
At around 9:30 oclock that same morning, Jessie Genova, Jr. was gathering malunggay leaves at their farm,[5] about thirty (30) meters away from the Julatons house,[6] when he heard appellant Dante Aton shouting and inviting him to smoke cigarettes.[7] As he was approaching the house, he noticed that appellant Aton was hiding his right hand behind the door while his left hand was holding a cigarette.[8] Near the door were the bodies of two (2) dead children, Gina and Rey.[9] When appellant Aton uttered ada na (here he comes),[10] appellant Charlie Almoguerra immediately went down the stairs holding assorted coins at his right hand and a bladed knife or machete at his left hand.[11] Appellant Almoguerra then forced him (Jessie Genova, Jr.) to accept the loose coins.[12] Frightened, he received the coins, placed them inside his pocket and ran away.
Meanwhile, upon being informed of the incident by Sonny Amor, spouses Florentino and Lily Julaton immediately returned home.[19] Along the way, they saw appellant Almoguerra on the upper part of the hill near their house.[20] Arriving there, they found all their children dead

STATE
The circumstance of killing was aggravated by treachery and dwelling. The mere fact of killing a child already constitutes treachery. The three (3) innocent children were all hacked to death without anyone defending for them all because of the evil minds of the accused. Killing a child is characterized as treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victims due to their tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused

ACCUSED
The trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide considering that the May 11, 1994 affidavit of prosecution witness Jessie Genova, Jr. does not mention the name of appellant Almoguerra as one of the assailants; and that appellant Atons May 20, 1994 affidavit stating that he was with Almoguerra when the latter committed the crime was obtained through force and maltreatment.

HELD
The killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack was not shown.[57] Considering that the victims in this case of robbery with homicide are young children, aged 7, 8 and 14, the killing was aggravated by treachery.

people vs. daniela 401 scra 519 G.R. No. 139230. April 24, 2003

FACTS
Ronito Enero and his common-law wife Maria Fe Balo and their three children: May, 4 years old, Joan, 3 years old, and Ronito, Jr., 1 year old, resided in Sawang, Calero, Pasil, Cebu City. The couple eked out a living vending fish at the Pasil public market near their house. They employed Leo Quilongquilong, the cousin of Maria Fe, as helper in their business and Julifer Barrera, a tomboy as their househelp. Both lived with the couple. Manuel Daniela had been a barkada of Ronito in Dansalam, Davao City years back, while Imelda, Manuels wife, was Maria Fes friend and former classmate.
Manuel told Ronito that he wanted to borrow money from him and Maria Fe. The latter refused to lend Manuel the money but she was prevailed upon by Ronito. Manuel, Jose and Ronito then had a drinking spree in the sala. Maria Fe and Julifer went to sleep in the formers bedroom while Leo slept in the sala.
At around 2:00 a.m. of March 31, 1996, Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and holding a flourescent lamp, entered the bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe. He poked the said gun on Maria Fe. She woke up and attempted to stand up but Manuel ordered her to lie down. Jose, armed with a knife followed Manuel to the bedroom. The latter ordered Jose to tie the hands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on her mouth. Jose complied. On orders of Manuel, Jose woke up Leo and brought him to the room. Jose tied the hands of Leo behind his back. Jose and Manuel then divested Maria Fe of her necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give them her money but Maria Fe told them that she had used her money to pay her partners in the fish vending business. Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe. They ransacked the room but failed to find money. Julifer woke up but Manuel and Jose threatened to kill her if she shouted. The two tied Julifers hands at her back. Manuel then threatened to explode the grenade tucked under his shirt and kill Maria Fe, her family and their househelps if she refused to surrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took the money from her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel and Jose. Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronito with it. Jose went to the kitchen, got a knife, covered Ronito with the blanket and sat on top of him then stabbed the latter several times. Manuel also stabbed Ronito on different parts of his body. Ronito could only groan like a dying pig. Manuel hit Ronito with the butt of his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito and took the latters wristwatch and ring. Manuel then untied Julifer, removed her clothes and panties and then raped her.

STATE
the appellant was guilty of robbery with homicide even if his original intention was to demand for separation pay from his employer and ended up killing his employer in the process. The trial court sentenced both appellants to death on its finding that the robbery with homicide was aggravated by nighttime and dwelling. It appreciated the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the appellants.


ACCUSED
dwelling is not aggravating in this case as it was not alleged in the amended information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information[31] and proved otherwise, even if proved but not alleged in the information, the same shall not be considered by the Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused.

HELD
The trial court correctly appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance against the appellants. There was no provocation on the part of Ronito and Maria Fe. The crime was committed in their dwelling. This Court held that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
The crime was committed at nighttime. However, there is no evidence that the appellants took advantage of the darkness of the night in committing the crime or that nighttime facilitates the commission of the crime. Indeed, the evidence on record shows that when appellant Manuel barged into the room of Maria Fe and Ronito, he was holding a kerosene lamp.[

people vs. bagsit 409 scra 350 G.R. No. 148877. August 19, 2003

FACTS
On 12 September 1999 at around twenty (20) minutes past eight oclock in the evening, prosecution witness Richard Sison[2] and his younger sister Heidi were watching television inside their house at Bgy. Soro-soro, Ilaya, Batangas City. When Richard looked out of the window, he saw a man whom he identified as Angelito Bagsit pointing a gun at his father Pepito Sison who was then closing the front door of their house. The barrel of the gun held by Angelito protruded thru their grilled window. Not for long, Richard heard a gunshot and almost simultaneously saw his father falling to the cement floor. With the help of his mother Teodora who came from his grandfathers house next door, Richard rushed his father to the hospital where he died shortly after.

STATE
Treachery qualified the killing to murder. The appellant, who closely positioned himself surreptitiously behind the window of the house of his unsuspecting victim while the latter had his back turned, and fired his gun execution style, eliminated any risk from any defense that the victim might put up.
With the passage of RA 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is not a separate crime but merely a special aggravating circumstance.[11] After having been sufficiently proved by way of a certification[12] dated 25 August 2000[13] that the appellant was not a licensed gun holder, an aggravating circumstance shall be appreciated against him pursuant to the above-mentioned law, which provides in part that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

ACCUSED
He did not step inside the victims dwelling when the crime was committed.

HELD
Dwelling, also alleged in the amended Information, is likewise aggravating. The triggerman showed greater perversity when, although outside the house, he attacked his victim inside the latters own house when he could have very well committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the victims home. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own abode, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside
RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; however, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed accordingly.

people vs. tiongson 130 scra 614 / G.R. Nos. L-35123-24 July 25, 1984

FACTS
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of October 26, 1971, the accused Rudy Tiongson escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, together with George de la Cruz and Rolando Santiago, where they were detained under the charge of Attempted Homicide. While in the act of escaping, the said Rudy Tiongson killed Pat. Zosimo Gelera, a member of the police force of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who was guarding the said accused, and PC Constable Aurelio Canela of the PC Detachment stationed in Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who went in pursuit of them.

STATE
That the commission of the offense was qualified by the circumstance of treachery, and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, in contempt of or with ingult to the public authorities, nocturnity, committed in an uninhabited place and with abuse of superior strength.

ACCUSED
The evidence presented by the prosecution does not warrant, nor support, the finding that the killing of Pat. Zosimo Gelera was qualified by treachery since the prosecution failed to present any eyewitness who directly saw the killing of Pat. Gelera.
The accused have not adopted a mode or means of attack tending directly to insure or facilitate the commission of the offense without risk to himself arising from the defense or retaliation which the victim might put up.
Police Chief Edwardo Borwangga did not also see the accused Rudy Tiongson shoot Pat. Gelera.

HELD
It may be true that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances listed therein, as stated by the trial judge, yet where there has been a hearing and such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, they should be disallowed in the judgment.

No Treachery
Treachery is not present in the killing of PC Constable Aurelio M. Canela since the deceased was actually warned by PC Sgt. Saway not to remain standing but seek cover because of the known presence of the accused in the vicinity, but that the said deceased disregarded the warning.
The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act of killing a human being must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner, mere presumptions or deductions from hypothetical facts not being sufficient to consider them justified.

No Evident premeditation
Evident premeditation must be ruled out in view of the absence of sufficient proof that a plan to kill the victims existed, the execution of which was preceded by deliberate thought and reflection. Besides, with respect to the killing of PC Constable Canela, only ten minutes passed from the time the accused escaped from the Municipal Jail up to the time he shot PC Constable Canela near the cemetery, 14 so that there was no lapse of time during which he could have deliberately planned the killing of the said PC Constable and meditated on the consequences of his act.

No contempt of or with insult to the public authorities
The aggravating circumstance that the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities cannot also be appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela were the very ones against whom the crime were committed. Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in authority.

Not committed in an uninhabited place
The lower court also found that the killing of PC Constable Canela was committed in an uninhabited place. It has not been shown, however, that the offense was committed in an isolated place, far from human habitation. In order that the aggravating circumstance of the commission of a crime in an uninhabited place may be considered, it is necessary that the place of occurrence be where there are no houses at all, a considerable distance from the village or town, or where the houses are a great distance apart. Here, PC Sgt. Saway merely declared that the place where PC Constable Canela was shot was about 700 meters away from the Municipal Building of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, 17 which does not satisfy the requirement. Besides, the record does not show that the place was intentionally sought by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. The accused was trying to evade his pursuers, PC Constable Canela among them, and their encounter was purely by chance. The lower court, therefore, erred in finding that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.

No abuse of superior strength
Finally, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength must also be ruled out since there is no direct evidence that the accused employed superior strength in the killing of Pat. Gelera. The accused was then a detainee and was unarmed while Pat. Gelera had his service pistol with him. With respect to PC Constable Canela, the accused was alone against three armed pursuers, namely: PC Sgt. Saway, PC Constable Canela, and Pat Nicandro Garcia, and a civilian by the name of Fred Barcelona.

People vs. MAgdueno G.R. No. L-68699 September 22, 1986

FACTS
On October 15, 1980, a few minutes past 8:00 o'clock in the morning, as soon as the late Fiscal Fernando M. Dilig had placed himself at the driver's seat inside his jeep parked near his house at the corner Roxas and D. Mendoza Streets, Puerto Princesa City, all of a sudden, two successive gunshots burst into the air, as the gunman coming from his left side aimed and poured said shots into his body, inflicting two fatal wounds that instantaneously caused his death.

Three witnesses positively identified the assailant as accused Hermogenes Magdueño:
(1) Elena Adion Lim,  while sitted (sic) at the gate of her fence, about 20 to 30 meters away from the house of Fiscal Dilig, saw the gunman coming from where she heard two successive shots when he passed by her house, bringing a short gun in his right hand and a clutch bag while hurriedly proceeding towards Liwanag Street.
(2) Ernesto Mari Y Gonzales, a security guard of the Malaria Eradication Service, this City, while on board a tricycle, passing in front of the house of Fiscal Dilig, on his way home, likewise heard the two gunshots coming from the direction of Fiscal Dilig's house, prompting him to order the driver to stop.
(3) Cynthia Canto a taxi dancer, residing at Jose Abad Santos, this City, while in front of the store of Aling Charing near the house of Fiscal Dilig, waiting for a tricycle, saw the gunman standing by for a quite time

Magdueño also executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted that he killed Fiscal Dilig for a price or reward and implicated Leonardo Senas and Mauricio de Leon to the commission of the crime. However, both Senas and de Leon were later dropped from the amended information for lack of a prima facie case against them. All the other accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.


STATE
The crime of Murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and aggravated by price or reward and by the crime being committed in contempt of/or with insult to public authority.

ACCUSED
The defense failed to show any motive on the part of these eyewitnesses to falsely accuse the appellant as having committed the crime.

HELD
Treachery in the commission of the crime is clearly established by the record.
The appellant fired two successive shots at the defenseless Fiscal Dilig while the latter was still seated in his jeep, hitting him at the neck and lumbar region. The manner of the execution was such that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted means and ways of committing the crime and insured its execution without risk to himself arising from any defense Fiscal Dilig might make. The fact that the appellant called out, "Fiscal" before shooting the victim does not negate the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Since the appellant was a hired killer, he wanted to insure that he was shooting the correct person. When Dilig turned his face to find out who was calling him, the appellant fired immediately rendering no opportunity for Dilig to defend himself.

In consideration of price or reward.
He agreed to kill Fiscal Dilig for a fee of P80,000.00, of which he will receive a clean bill of P 30,000.00.Magdueño, in effect, also admitted that he was a recidivist at the time of his trial. However, recidivism was not alleged in the information and makes no difference in the determination of the penalty in this case.

No insult to public authority
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does not seem to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be shown that the crime was not committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was not committed against the public authority himself.
In the instant case Fiscal Dilig, the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim.

People vs Paraiso G.R. No. 127840. November 29, 1999

FACTS
Prosecution eyewitness Sheila Marie Alipio, then 18 years old, is the niece of the victim. Her father Medelino is the brother of the victim Lolita. Their house is located some 50 meters away from the house of the victim. Sheila testified that at around 1:30 in the afternoon of June 11, 1995, she went to the house of the victim to deliver a one-gallon water container. At the main door of her aunts house, she saw two (2) men, including accused herein, standing about a meter away from her. She rang the doorbell and after a while, her aunt opened the door. All of a sudden, one o the two men pushed her inside the victims house. She stumbled and when she looked back, she saw one of them pointing a gun, about 8 to 10 inches long, at her aunts right temple.
Sheila further testified that the other man was armed with a Batangas fan knife which he poked at her right side. They were herded upstairs into one of the rooms, together with the victims children, Epifanio, Jr., Ferdinand and Kim. Paraiso was allegedly holding the victim Lolita and asked for the key; he likewise ordered the victim to open the cabinet and ransacked and searched the same. He asked where the money was placed but Lolita took from her pocket the amount of P200.00 which she handed to Paraiso saying that it was all that she had. Paraiso likewise took jewelries, wristwatch and video camera. Paraiso and his male companion brought the victim to the bathroom and ransacked the cabinet. Paraiso later ordered his companion to cover Sheila and her cousins with pillows. Sheila peeped through the pillows and saw Ferdinand being tied up. Her aunt pleaded with the perpetrators not to harm the children. Later, Sheila saw her aunt being taken to the childrens room but her aunt came back bloodied and clutching her breast.

Another witness for the prosecution was Epifanio Tigle, Jr., then 15 years old, who is the son of the victim. In the courtroom, he pointed to accused-appellant Paraiso as one of the two (2) men who robbed and killed his mother.[7] He testified that on June 27, 1995, he, together with his siblings, went to the office of the NBI wherein a cartographic sketch was drawn of one of the suspects (since he was present when his mother was robbed and killed); that he, together with his brothers, Ferdinand and Kim and his cousin Sheila went to the Chief of Police at the Municipal Building of Minglanilla on April 19, 1996 to inform him that the suspects in the robbery case in Argao were not the ones who robbed and killed his mother.[8] He further testified that he, his mother and brothers were inside their house at their mothers room when Sheila, who was at the main door, was ordered to enter their house; and that the robbers ordered them to stay inside their mothers room.

STATE
In the present case, not one, but four (4) eyewitnesses identified him as one of the robbers. Appellant was positively identified by four (4) eyewitnesses, namely: Sheila Marie Alipio, Epifanio Tigley, Jr., Ferdinand Tigley and Kim Tigley who were all present at the scene of the crime.Sheila gave a vivid description of the perpetrators.
The witnesses delayed reporting of what they know about the crime does not render their testimonies false or incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case.
The felony at bar was attended by three aggravating circumstances, to wit: that the act was committed in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her sex, that the act was committed in the dwelling of the offended party (morada) without the offended party having given any provocation therefore, and that advantage was taken by the accused and of his companion of their superior strength.

ACCUSED
Appellant likewise argues that eyewitnesses may have been mistaken in identifying him as one of the perpetrators.
Appellant contends that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because there were facts and circumstances that the court a quo did not consider in his favor and that the evidence presented by the prosecution is flimsy and unreliable.
If the prosecution eyewitnesses had actually seen and recognized the malefactors, they would have reported the appellant, who is one of their neighbors, to the police immediately or within a reasonable time after the incident took place. However, it took the eyewitnesses ten (10) months to identify the appellant as one of the malefactors and the prosecution never gave any plausible reason for such delay.

HELD
Delay in reporting the crime is not sufficient to doubt the truthfulness of the accusation. One may immediately report the incident to the proper authorities while another, in fear and/or avoiding involvement in a criminal investigation, may keep to himself what he had witnessed

Dwelling
In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended partys house.[43] Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.

Abuse of superior strength
Abuse of superior strength may be considered when there is an inequality of comparative force between the victim and the aggressor, there must, nonetheless, be a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of by the latter in the commission of the crime.[45] What should be considered is not that there were three, four or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense.[46] Abuse of strength is present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor but also when the offender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party.[47] Here, the victim was totally helpless in the face of two (2) perpetrators who were armed with a gun and a knife.

However, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of her sex cannot be appreciated. This aggravating circumstance can be considered only in crimes against persons and honor.[48] The special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide is a crime against property not against persons.[49] Nonetheless, even if such aggravating circumstance could be considered in this case, it cannot be appreciated because nothing appears in the record from which it may be presumed that in the commission of the crime, appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the age or sex of the offended party. Moreover, such an aggravating circumstance would be absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

people vs. arizobal 341 scra 143

FACTS
The prosecution presented, among others, Clementina Gimenez, wife of victim Laurencio Gimenez. She testified that on 24 March 1994 she together with her husband Laurencio Gimenez and a grandchild were sound asleep in their house in Tuybo, Cataingan, Masbate. At around 9:30 in the evening, Laurencio roused her from sleep and told her to open the door because there were persons outside the house. Since it was pitch-dark she lit a kerosene lamp and stood up to open the door. She was suddenly confronted by three (3) armed men pointing their guns at her. She recognized two (2) of them as Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes but failed to recognize the third person who was wearing a maskara. She readily identified Clarito because she used to pass by his house in San Rafael while Erly was also a familiar face as he was a regular habitue of the flea market.
The intruders ransacked their cabinet and scattered everything on the floor until they found P8,000.00 among sheets of paper. Before leaving with their loot they ordered Laurencio to go with them to Jimmy's house because "we have something to talk about."[5] Against his will, Laurencio went with them. Clementina recalled that shortly after the group left she heard a volley of shots
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape. Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost consciousness.

STATE
The robbery with killing was aggravated: 1) By a band because the malefactors were more than three armed robbers acting together; 2) With treachery because the robbers tied the hand of the victims before killing them; 3) By nighttime (nocturnity) because the accused took advantage of the night; and, 4) By dwelling because the robbery is (sic) committed with violence against or intimidation of persons x x x and the commission of the crime begun in the dwelling

ACCUSED
The failure of Clementina Gimenez to actually witness the killing of her son and her husband is adequate proof that she failed to identify him as the killer.

HELD
Dwelling
Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile.[17] In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed.

No Treachery
The accused stand charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code.

No Band
malefactors took part in the commission of the crime, the evidence on record does not disclose that "more than three" persons were armed, and robbery in "band" means "more than three armed malefactors united in the commission of robbery." Nowhere in the records can we gather that more than three (3) of the robbers were armed. Hence, "band" cannnot be aggravating where no proof is adduced that at least four (4) of the five (5) perpetrators involved in this case were armed.

No Night Time
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime did not attend the commission of the crime. The fact that the offense was committed at 9:30 in the evening does not suffice to sustain nocturnidad for, by itself, nighttime is not an aggavating circumstance.[23] To be properly so considered, it must be shown that nocturnidad was deliberately and intentionally sought by accused-appellants to help them realize their evil intentions.[24] Nowhere can we infer from the records that the malefactors sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the accomplishment of their devious design. On the contrary, the locus criminis was well lighted and nighttime was merely an incidental element to the whole drama.

People vs Bajar G.R. No. 143817 : October 27, 2003

FACTS
On 16 August 1999 8pm, Ana was lying on the side of a wall that separated the bedroom from the sala. This wall was made of bamboo splits with holes or gaps in between such that she could clearly see her grandfather lying on his bed in the sala.7 A gas lamp lit up the bedroom, while another hung on the wall near the foot of the bed of her grandfather
The scenario was broken by the voice of Alejandro, who was still obviously very drunk, inquiring whether his wife was in the house. While speaking his demand, he pushed the main door to gain entry into the house, but he was not able to enter. Aquilio answered that his wife was in their (Alejandros) house. Alejandro accused Aquilio of lying and of hiding his daughter. Aquilio told Alejandro to go home. Silence thereafter ensued

STATE
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the crime.
Ana heard a sound and saw that Alejandro was able to enter the house through the kitchen door. He was carrying a bolo and approaching her grandfather. She saw her father hack her grandfather, who was lying on the bed. She got up, ran towards the sala, and saw her father still hacking his grandfather. She yelled for her father to stop. While he was being stabbed and attacked, Aquilio stood up to embrace his son-in-law. Ana shouted for help as she held down the hand which her father used to wield the bolo.
Lolita, having heard the cries of her daughter, came to her fathers house. There, she saw Aquilio embracing Alejandro. She then instructed Ana to hold on to Alejandro while she looked for a piece of wood with which to hit him. With the piece of wood she found, she struck Alejandros head three times. Alejandro fainted. By this time, Aquilio slowly sank down to the floor12 and drew his last breath.13 Lolita forthwith went outside to seek the help of neighbors. Anas uncle, Tating Aganap, arrived and later brought two policemen, who handcuffed Alejandro

ACCUSED
Alejandro also maintains that, other than the fact that Aquilio was then 85 years old, no specific fact or circumstance was proved showing disregard of age. In the same vein, there was no clear proof that his alleged intoxication was habitual or intentional.
Treachery was not proved because there was no direct evidence that the commencement of the alleged attack on Aquilio was sudden and unexpected. In addition, even if treachery was present, it was not specifically alleged in the information as qualifying the killing of the victim into the crime of murder.

HELD
Treachery
Ana narrated that there was an ensuing silence after Aquilio told Alejandro to go home. It was apparent that Aquilio resumed his interrupted sleep. Even Ana was undisturbed by the exchange of words, for she remained in the bedroom lying down and ready to sleep. Aquilio and his grandchildren had no inkling that Alejandro would trespass his dwelling by entering through the kitchen door. Aquilio was completely unaware of the impending attack and, ultimately, his doom. And suddenly, Alejandro hacked him on the face as he was lying down resting on his bed. The means, method, and form of the attack in this case were, therefore, consciously adopted and effectively forestalled Aquilio from employing a defense against his attacker.
The information against Alejandro states in part that he, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85-year-old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death. The information sufficiently warned him of the circumstance of treachery which, once proved, qualifies the crime of murder.

Dwelling
Aquilio did not provoke Alejandro; it was Alejandro who rudely and drunkenly interrupted the quiet and restful evening Aquilio was enjoying. He even attempted to enter the house without being invited and without the door being opened for him. Clearly, because of his drunken condition, he was not welcome

Disregard of the Respect
This is obvious in this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age, considered old enough to be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared in open court that he was 58 years old),40 he was also the latters father-in-law.

Abuse of confidence
people vs. mandolado 123 scra 133 G.R. No. L-51304-05 June 28, 1983

FACTS
In the morning of October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon, trainees/draftees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato. They alighted at the bus terminal in Midsayap. Being all in uniform, armed and belonging to the same military outfit, they got acquainted and decided to drink ESQ rum, at the said bus terminal.
While drinking, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon decided to join appellants in going to Pikit, North Cotabato, home base of appellants After drinking for about an hour, appellant Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market. Subsequently, he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started firing. His companions tried to dissuade him but he nonetheless continued firing his gun.

Sensing trouble, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon ran away, hailed and boarded a passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded also the vehicle. The soldiers forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to the Midsayap crossing. On their way, appellant Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver. After appellants alighted at said crossing, the Ford Fiera sped away. Appellant Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the speeding vehicle hitting the right side of the back of the driver's sister who was then on board said vehicle.

STATE
The killing of the two victims in the case at bar is correctly qualified as murder, there being present the qualifying circumstance of treachery which is alleged in the informations. The prosecution evidence is quite clear and explicit that when appellants alighted from the jeep, the accused Mandolado immediately fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the occupants of the jeep, the victims Nolasco Mendoza and Herminigildo Tenorio, and both of them died instantaneously on the spot, and from this sudden means or manner of attack, it can reasonably be concluded that it tended directly to insure its execution without risk to the appellant-assailant and also deprive the victims of any chance or opportunity to defend themselves.

ACCUSED
Appellants contend that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution merely proved the fact of the deaths of Tenorio and Mendoza and not as to the actual perpetrators of the crime; that the evidence of the prosecution being weak on its own, the only link of the appellant Mandolado to the killings is his extra-judicial sworn confession, which he stoutly repudiates for being unlawfully taken under force and duress and in the failure of the investigator to apprise him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.

HELD
The Supreme Court did not agree with the finding of the trial court that the aggravating circumstances of (1) advantage was taken of his being a Draftee in the Philippine Army, and (2) abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present in the commission of the crime.

There could be no abuse of confidence as the evidence on record showed the lack of confidence by the victims to the appellants, that this confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the confidence facilitated the commission of the crimes. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime.
 It is also essential that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that such confidence was a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence.
In the instant case, there is absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest between the victims and the assailants who had just met each other then. Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the crimes.

Evident Premeditation [G.R. No. 127153. October 23, 2003]

people vs aposaga 414 scra 69

FACTS
On March 28, 1992, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, he was with Marlon Tad-y, Wilbert Vasquez, and the deceased Medel Sigueza drinking a small bottle of whiskey at the house of Friday Magalona in Burgos Street, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. After an hour, the deceased wanted to go home. The group went to accompany the deceased home when they chanced upon two persons named Windy and Rey who invited them to have another round of drinks. The group were already drinking beer at Foodtastic restaurant near an emergency hospital when appellant happened to pass by. The deceased invited him to join them but appellant angrily declined, saying, I will not drink, I will go home.[3] At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, the group started on their way home when appellant suddenly appeared from behind a mango tree. Appellant, who was carrying an axe in his right hand and a long pointed instrument in his left, shouted at the deceased to come near him. As appellant advanced towards the group, Alipoon tried to pacify appellant and block his path. When Alipoon placed his hand on appellants shoulder, appellant brushed away his hand. Undeterred, Alipoon again placed his hand on appellants shoulder and placated him saying, We were just drinking on the same glass, lets forget this and settle this tomorrow. Appellant answered Yes, but as soon as Jeffrey turned to leave, appellant rushed towards the deceased shouting, You son of a bitch! Alipoon, who told the deceased to run, noticed appellant raise his left hand which was holding a long pointed instrument. Moments later, Alipoon heard a thud as the two men grappled with each other to wrest control of the weapons held by appellant. Thereafter, the deceased ran towards the house of a certain Peleng Mugat at Sitio Boling-Boling while appellant also ran in the same direction.[4] Alipoon, on the other hand, accompanied by Wilbert and Marlon, proceeded to the house of the father of the deceased, Tio Manuel, located twenty meters away from the place of the incident. After reporting the incident to Tio Manuel, Alipoon and his companions, together with the father of the deceased, headed back to the place of the incident, equipped with a flashlight. When they reached the place, they found the deceased in a pool of blood, lying face up. They brought the deceased to the emergency hospital in Hinigaran and later had him transferred to the Riverside Hospital in Bacolod City where the deceased expired

STATE
The killing was attended with evident premeditation because appellant and the deceased had a quarrel a month before the stabbing incident took place. The conflict between the two men had never been settled. The trial court further held that when appellant saw the deceased drinking with a group of men, he had already decided to kill the deceased as manifested by the fact that he refused the offer made by the deceased to join them in their drinking session. The trial court said that the killing of the deceased was preceded by a calm resolution of the accused to kill the victim after having had a sufficient period of time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

ACCUSED
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the existence of evident premeditation in the killing of the deceased since there is no competent and direct evidence of the particular time when appellant allegedly hatched the plan to kill the deceased. Appellant laments that the trial court gave undue credence to the statement made by the witness for the prosecution, Delilah Mugat, that appellant, just before the stabbing incident, asked Mugat what is her preferred position should she die. Appellant insists his conversation with Mugat was nothing but a casual attempt at small talk because he was then trying to borrow a flashlight from her. Appellant says there is no proof from the conversation he had with Mugat that he actually planned to kill the deceased.

HELD
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during an interval of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[32] There must be evidence showing that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when the crime was conceived by him and the time it was actually perpetrated. The premeditation must be evident and not merely suspected.
In its appellees brief, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that the killing of the deceased was attended by evident premeditation as shown by the following circumstances: Appellant happened to pass by at the Foodtastic restaurant shortly after eight oclock in the evening when the deceased invited him to join the group for a drink. Appellant, who had a misunderstanding with the deceased a month before, angrily declined the invitation of the deceased to join them in a drinking session. When appellant dropped by at the store where Delilah Mugat was, also at around past eight oclock in the evening, appellant asked the latter what position she would prefer if she were to die.[33] Appellant left after borrowing a flashlight from Mugat which he returned later. At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, Mugat saw appellant already carrying an axe. Based on the testimonies of Alipoon and Tad-y, it was also around 11:00 oclock in the evening when appellant, armed with an axe and a long pointed instrument, suddenly emerged from behind a mango tree when they, together with the deceased, happened to pass by. Appellant then challenged the deceased to come nearer. Alipoon tried to pacify Appellant but the latter went past him and rushed towards the deceased, stabbing the latter at the back. The Office of the Solicitor General thus concluded that the attendance of evident premeditation in the killing of the deceased was clearly established.

people gialolo vs 414 scra 278 [G.R. No. 152135. October 23, 2003]

FACTS
Appellants Federico and Marcos Gialolo are father and son, respectively. Appellant Oscar Makabenta is the cousin of Federicos wife. The victim Jose Platon is a neighbor of the appellants at Brgy. Bulod, Barugo, Leyte.

The facts show that at around half past three in the early morning of April 13, 1994, prosecution witness Desiderio Baculi was awakened by a call of nature.[4] While urinating, he heard a voice coming from the house of appellant Federico Gialolo, saying, What is this?[5] He peeped through the wall of his kitchen made of hog wire towards the house of appellant Federico which was more or less, twenty (20) meters from his house.[6] He saw the three appellants, together with the victim Jose Platon. The place was illuminated by an incandescent lamp situated near the door outside Federicos house.[7] The victim was held close by appellants Federico Gialolo and Oscar Makabenta. Federico embraced the victims left side with both arms, while Oscar embraced the victims right side below the waist also with both his arms.[8] Appellant Marcos Gialolo was at the back of Jose. He pulled Joses hair with his left hand and then slashed his neck with a scythe.[9] They then left Jose who zigzagged towards a nearby coconut tree by the side of the road, where he eventually fell. The three appellants proceeded to Federicos house, and switched off the light

STATE
The appellants are guilty of murder considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The two elements of treachery have been proved in the case at bar, namely: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the assailant(s) consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means or method of attack employed by him.[29] In the case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend himself in any way. They held and immobilized him before appellant Marcos Gialolo slashed his neck with a scythe.

ACCUSED
The accused contend that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. Lastly, they contest the award of damages to the victims heirs

HELD
No aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against the appellants. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be present: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he has adhered to such determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act.[30] In the case at bar, no proof was presented to show any of these elements. Nor can the aggravating circumstance of superior strength be appreciated against the appellants. This circumstance was not alleged in the Information and hence cannot be the subject of proof during the trial. Even disregarding this bar, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery.

people vs. saylan 130 scra 159  G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984


FACTS
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman and a resident of Barrio Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom teacher of the Malinao Elementary School.
 It was almost 6:30 o'clock in the evening when the jeepney arrived at the Malinas citrus farm.After walking some distance and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the group and took the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group took the opposite road lwphl@itç  The appellant, however, joined the group of Eutropia and when they reached the place where the road was plain, appellant who was then walking side by side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a dagger about eight inches long and pointing it at the latter said, "Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!At this juncture, appellant placed his right arm around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger pointed at her left breast, after which he dragged Eutropia at some distance. When they reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following them. Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were  The appellant then ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered her to lie down. Subsequently, appellant placed himself on top of the victim and inserted his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her by moving his buttocks up and down.

Appellan raped the victim five times on different positions.  After satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked Eutropia if she will tell her husband what he did to her and the latter answered, "I will not tell". But she only said this so that appellant would let her go home

STATE
It is contrary to reason and it has not been shown that Mrs. Agno, a school teacher, was bereft of common sense. For if it was true that the sexual act was indeed mutually desired and performed why did she complain not only to her husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the appellant is carried out in a discreet manier. On the other hand, the version of the complainant has indicia of credibility. For her version bared her shame to a small community and her exposure was necessary only because she had to reveal the truth.
This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

ACCUSED
The sexual intercourse was mutually agreed. Studies of many experts in the matter have shown that the 'dog style position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.

HELD
No Superiority
The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape.

Uninhabited PLace
Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment

Ignominy
There was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind.

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 180016April 29, 2014

The Value of Peso in 1930.

The purchasing power of the peso has significantly changed after eight decades, and it is time that we interpret the law the way it should be: to reflect the relative range of values it had when it was promulgated. In doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just construing what it actually means.

 The formula for present value is known and has been relied upon in the business community. Inflation rates may be discovered using the latest statistics extrapolating for the years when there had been no available values.
 
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.

 imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),

 Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37

TSN, Oral Aguments - proposal to amend RPC

until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty.


How to cetermine value of peso
x x x x

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. In order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.









7.   Rule in reckless imprudence (complex crime or not). Focus on the case of People vs. Ivler.
Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. Hence, prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court(Ivler v. Modesto- San Pedro,635 SCRA 191).

8.   Can Rebellion now be complexed with other common crimes?
No, rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. Rebellion absorbs all common crimes. It was held by the Supreme Court in People v. Hernandez that such common crimes are absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion and it was held in Enrile v. Salazar that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion, as means necessary for the perpetration of the offense. However, a rebel who, for some independent or personal motive commits murder or other common offenses in addition to rebellion, may be prosecuted for and convicted of such common offenses.

9.   Rule in the use of firearms and automatic firearms
The use of firearms in complex crimes are governed by the rule that several shots from a submachine gun causing deaths which is caused by a single act of pressing the trigger is considered a complex crime. Also one bullet shot from an ordinary firearm which resulted to multiple deaths is also considered as a complex crime. The Supreme Court held in People v. Buyco that the act is categorized as constituting one single act.

10.   Evaluate the ruling in the case of People vs. Makilang and People vs. Luna
In People v. Makilang the accused argued that he should be entitled to an acquittal because Evelyn declared that she had already forgiven her father from raping her. In the situations like these where the offended party is a minor, the pardon must be given by both the parents and the offended party. Even if Evelyn forgave her father and the mother did not pardon the offender then an acquittal is not warranted.


In People v. Luna the express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter’s parents is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by express pardon from the girl herself.

11.   Rule on reclusion perpetua on whether it is divisible or indivisible.
AS SINGLE INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES Although Section 17 of the Republic Act No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetuafrom twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to after its original classification as an indivisible penalty. See People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589; People vs. Lucas, 240 SCRA 66.

To dos
1. (10-11)prepare a power point presentation for Legal research Case (pictorial presentation)
2. (11-12)Read 20 pages in pfr
4. (12-01)Read 1 full case in consti law
3. (01-3)answer 2017 criminal law bar questions
5. convert legal english to babylon

2.   Can there be a complex crime of coup d’état with rebellion?
Yes, if there was conspiracy between the offender/ offenders committing the coup d’etat and the offenders committing the rebellion. By conspiracy, the crime of one would be the crime of the other and vice versa. This is possible because the offender in coup d'etat may be any person or persons belonging to the military or the national police or a public officer, whereas rebellion does not so require. Moreover, the crime of coup d’etat may be committed singly, whereas rebellion requires a public uprising and taking up arms to overthrow the duly constituted government. Since the two crimes are essentially different and punished with distinct penalties, there is no legal impediment to the application of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

3.   Effect of pardon given by the President in the exercise of his pardoning power.
(1) It shall not work the restoration of the right to hold pubic office, or the right of suffrage except when such rights were expressly restored by the terms of the pardon; and
(2) It shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36- RPC).
Limitations:
1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction by final judgment;
2. It does not extend to cases of impeachment.

4.   Can a penal action be extinguished after the institution of criminal action? (RPC 113)
Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.




5.   Examine the case of Santiago vs. Garchitorena G.R. No. L-109266, December 2, 1993,
The single larceny doctrine can be applied in other offenses like Estafa, Violation of B.P. 22 or in Violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

This was enunciated by the Supreme Court when it ordered the consolidation of the 32 separate informations filed against Miriam Defensor Santiago in one information for alleged Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 when she was still the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Her acts of signing the 32 release orders of overstaying aliens proceeded from the belief that there was no legal basis for their continued detention. (Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214)


6.   Examine the case of Declarador vs. Hon. Gubaton
It is ruled that Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, will be automatically suspended without a need for application except when the youthful offender was disqualified on any one of the following grounds:
(1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions,
(2) to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment,
(3) to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. In this case, the youthful offender’s crime of murder is punishable, not the actual sentence, by death or life imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic suspension of sentence is not applicable.
For the liability, the parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.

11.   Rule on reclusion perpetua on whether it is divisible or indivisible.
AS SINGLE INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES Although Section 17 of the Republic Act No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetuafrom twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to after its original classification as an indivisible penalty. See People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589; People vs. Lucas, 240 SCRA 66.

12.   Distinction of reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment.
A distinction must be made between the penalty of "life imprisonment" and reclusion perpetua.
(1) Life imprisonment is a penalty in special laws while reclusion perpetua is imposed by the Revised Penal Code;
(2) life imprisonment does not carry accessory penalties, whereas reclusion perpetua does;
(3) life imprisonment is indefinite, whereas reclusion perpetua is for 30 years after which the convict is eligible for pardon. The distinction is important because under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure a person charged with an offense punishable by "life imprisonment" was entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, effective October 1,1994, Rule 114 was amended placing "life imprisonment" on the same level as death and reclusion perpetua.

13.   When may a judge impose an alternative penalty of fine or imprisonment?
(2005 Bar Question)
When the offender is convicted of a penal law which imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the judge may impose a penalty of fine and imprisonment or both. However, the judge may not validly impose an alternative penalty. Although the law may prescribe an alternative penalty for a crime, it does not mean that the court may impose the alternative penalties at the same time. The sentence must be definite, otherwise the judgment cannot attain finality.

14.   Read all the cases on probation.  Read RA 10707.

15.   The rule and exceptions for the civil liability of the accused in case of acquittal of the accused in a criminal case.
The rule and exceptions for the civil liability of the accused in case of acquittal of the accused in a criminal case.
The general rule is that the civil action is not necessarily extinguished by the acquittal of the accused. Even if the accused is acquitted, the court can still award civil liability in the following cases:
1.When the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt and there was no negligence
2.When there is a declaration in the decision that the liability of the accused is only civil.
3.When the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted (independent civil actions) However, if the decision contains a finding that the act from which the civil liability may arise doesn’t exist, the civil liability is extinguished

ØExceptions to the rule that acquittal from a criminal case extinguishes civil liability, are:
1.When the civil action is based on obligations not arising from the act complained of as a felony;
2.When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt or acquittal is on the ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt (Art. 29, New Civil Code);
3.Acquittal due to an exempting circumstance, like Insanity;
4.Where the court states in its Judgment that the case merely involves a civil obligation;
5.Where there was a proper reservation for the filing of a separate civil action;
6.In cases of independent civil actions provided for in Arts. 31, 32, 33and 34 of the New Civil Code;
7.When the judgment of acquittal includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Sapiera vs. CA, 314 SCRA 370);
8.Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted (Sapiera vs. CA. 314 SCRA 370).

16.   The rule on award of damages.  Remember the case where the accused was found guilty of 5 counts of rape for having carnal knowledge with the same woman?  Learn again the application of the rules on indemnity.
This award stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts. 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code.

Civil Indemnity (2005 Bar Question)
The accused was found guilty of 10 counts of rape for having carnal knowledge with the same woman. In addition to the penalty of imprisonment, he was ordered to pay indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count. On appeal, the accused questions the award of civil indemnity for each count, considering that the victim is the same woman.
How would you rule on the contention of the accused? Explain. (3%)
Suggested Answer
The contention of the accused is without merit. Each count of rape is a violation of the person of the victim and thus gives rise to corresponding criminal and civil liabilities. The trial court is correct in imposing a penalty for each rape and awarding corresponding civil indemnity for each count even though the victim is the same woman. Rape is not a continued crime.


17.   Requisites and the rules in case of subsidiary liability of employers.
The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. (Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 1) However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of
1.The existence of an employer-employee relationship;
2.That the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
3.That the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and
4.That said employee is insolvent. (Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397, 402 [1996].)

18.   The instances or situations in criminal cases wherein the accused, either as an adult or as a minor, can apply for and/or be granted a suspended sentence.
Execution and service (2006 Bar Question)
Application for suspended sentence. There are at least 7 instances or situations in criminal cases wherein the accused, either as an adult or as a minor, can apply for and/or be granted a suspended sentence. Enumerate at least 5 of them. 5%

Instances when sentence may be suspended are: (at least 7 instances)
1.Where the accused became insane before sentence could be promulgated (Art. 79, RPC);
2.Where the offender, upon conviction by the trial court, filed an application for probation which has been granted (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148119841);
3.Where the offender needs to be confined in a rehabilitation center because of drug-dependency although convicted of the crime charged;
4.Where the offender is a youthful offender under Art. 192, PD 603, otherwise referred to as the Child and Youth Welfare Code; and
5.Where the, crime was committed when the offender is under 18 years of age and he is found guilty thereof in accordance with Rep. Act 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006", but the trial court subjects him to appropriate disposition measures as prescribed by the SupremeCourt in the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
6.The death sentence shall be suspended upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one year after delivery. (Art. 83, Revised Penal Code)
7.Section 66 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
8.SECTION 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. - An accused who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions:
a. He/she has not been previously convicted of of this Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Revised Penal Code; or of any special penal laws;
b.He/she has not been previously committed care of a DOH-accredited physician; and
c. The, Board favorably recommends that suspended xxx" violating any provision as amended; or to a Center or to the his/her sentence be "SECTION 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. -An accused
9.When the sentence is death, its execution may be suspended orpostponed by the Supreme Court, through the issuance of a RO upon the ground of supervening events (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 [19991).

19.   The rule in case of violation of conditional pardon, parole or probation.  How much of the remaining penalty would be served?
Under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a defendant who is charged with having violated his conditional pardon may be arrested and rearrested to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence by order of the Chief Executive, without notice or previous hearing for the determination whether the condition of the pardon has been violated by the defendant; while under section 159 of the Revised Penal Code such hearing or investigation of facts is necessary as part of due process of law.

It is to be observed that the condition of a pardon may consist, not in that the defendant shall not violate any of the penal laws as in the present case, where a certified copy of the final judgment of defendant's conviction would generally be sufficient, without any further investigation, to show that the defendant has violated his conditional pardon, but in that the prisoner shall not be guilty of any misconduct as in the case of U.S. vs. Ignacio (33 Phil., 203), or of any infraction of the law punishable with a certain penalty as in the case of U.S. vs. Villalon (37 Phil., 325), or in any other, in which cases it would be necessary to make an investigation of the facts before the conditional pardon may be revoked.

20.   Application of the ISL (you will be asked to show how you arrived at the penalty).
21.   Computation of Loss of Earning Capacity.
22.   The new rule on payment of damages.

2.   Can there be a complex crime of coup d’état with rebellion?
Yes, if there was conspiracy between the offender/ offenders committing the coup d’etat and the offenders committing the rebellion. By conspiracy, the crime of one would be the crime of the other and vice versa. This is possible because the offender in coup d'etat may be any person or persons belonging to the military or the national police or a public officer, whereas rebellion does not so require. Moreover, the crime of coup d’etat may be committed singly, whereas rebellion requires a public uprising and taking up arms to overthrow the duly constituted government. Since the two crimes are essentially different and punished with distinct penalties, there is no legal impediment to the application of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

3.   Effect of pardon given by the President in the exercise of his pardoning power.
(1) It shall not work the restoration of the right to hold pubic office, or the right of suffrage except when such rights were expressly restored by the terms of the pardon; and
(2) It shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36- RPC).
Limitations:
1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction by final judgment;
2. It does not extend to cases of impeachment.

4.   Can a penal action be extinguished after the institution of criminal action? (RPC 113)
Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.




5.   Examine the case of Santiago vs. Garchitorena G.R. No. L-109266, December 2, 1993,
The single larceny doctrine can be applied in other offenses like Estafa, Violation of B.P. 22 or in Violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

This was enunciated by the Supreme Court when it ordered the consolidation of the 32 separate informations filed against Miriam Defensor Santiago in one information for alleged Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 when she was still the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Her acts of signing the 32 release orders of overstaying aliens proceeded from the belief that there was no legal basis for their continued detention. (Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214)


6.   Examine the case of Declarador vs. Hon. Gubaton
It is ruled that Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, will be automatically suspended without a need for application except when the youthful offender was disqualified on any one of the following grounds:
(1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions,
(2) to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment,
(3) to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. In this case, the youthful offender’s crime of murder is punishable, not the actual sentence, by death or life imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic suspension of sentence is not applicable.
For the liability, the parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs City Mayor GR L-24693 31 July 1967

FACTS:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels.

1. that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
2. that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence.
3. that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives.

4.  That a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian.
5. that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments

The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

ISSUE:
Wether or not said ordinance is part of the police power of the respondent Mayor.

HELD: Yes.
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power.The resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside.

This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs

The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation

   

PhilCivilCode: Volume IV (Obligations Contracts) Paras 2008

Consti cases I

plain English
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A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

FACTS:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question,


Oscar Landicho
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%.
He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made.


Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian (examiner in Civil Law, )
1. Invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year". This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself.

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).


Ramon E. Galang.
the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.


Supreme Court
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter.
Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.)


Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

In the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.


5 Bar Examiners
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.


Guillermo Pablo Jr.
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission.


Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang
 a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.


Judge, Bernardo Pardo, (examiner in Political Law and Public International Law)
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;


Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law
That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).


Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith


Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law
xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).